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PROPERTY RIGHTS OF A SAME-SEX COUPLE: THE
OUTLOOK AFTER MARVIN
I. INTRODUCTION
Gay or lesbian pairs (hereinafter referred to as "same-sex" couples)
have traditionally met with failure in their efforts to gain state legal
recognition of their relationships.' In some states, they have at best
been given only grudging recognition by large segments of the public.
Courts have tended to reflect similar societal attitudes in their treat-
ment of couples comprised of the same sex. They have, for instance,
consistently limited the benefits of conventional matrimony to heter-
osexuals.2
The case of Marvin v. Marvin,3 decided by the California Supreme
Court in 1976, focused attention on the legal and equitable remedies4
available to couples living outside the bounds of conventional matri-
mony. It also raised some important questions concerning the possibil-
ity of whether those remedies, which are normally reserved for married
heterosexual couples, could also apply to same-sex couples. In Marvin,
plaintiff Michelle Triola alleged that she and actor Lee Marvin had
orally agreed to live together and, at the same time, "'hold themselves
I. See, e.g., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (upheld denial of
marriage license to female couple); Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191 N.W.2d 185 (1971),
appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (held statute governing marriage does not authorize
couples of the same sex to marry); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 67 Misc. 2d 982, 325
N.Y.S.2d 499 (1971) (marriage of two males, one of whom was a putative transsexual, was
held to be a nullity); Singer v. Hara, II Wash. App. 247, 522 P.2d 1187 (1974) (same-sex
relationships are outside the proper scope of marriage). See generally Comment, Same Sex
Marriage and the Constitution, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 275 (1973); Comment, The Legality of Ho-
mosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). See also McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54
(8th Cir. 1976) (held that the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in the Baker case was
determinative in prohibiting a same-sex marriage in Minnesota); M.T. v. J.T., 140 N.J.
Super. 77, 355 A.2d 204, cert. denied, 71 N.J. 345, 364 A.2d 1076 (1976) (post-operative
transsexual was considered to have the capacity to marry because she was no longer the
same sex as her partner).
2. Singer v. Hara, 11 Wash. App. 247, 255, 522 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1974). The Singer court
noted that the same-sex couple was "being denied entry into the marriage relationship be-
cause of the recognized definition of that relationship as one which may be entered into only
by two persons who are members of the opposite sex." Id (footnote omitted).
The California Civil Code was recently modified to define marriage as "a personal rela-
tion arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman .... " CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 4100 (West Supp. 1978), as amended by 1977 Cal. Stats., ch. 339, § 1 (new language em-
phasized).
3. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
4. See text accompanying note 10 infra.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW
out to the general public as husband and wife.' "I The Marvins also
allegedly agreed to "'combine their efforts and earnings and. . . share
equally any. . property accumulated"' while they lived together.6 In
addition, Michelle was to forego her career as a singer and entertainer
in order to devote herself to Lee" 'as a companion, homemaker, house-
keeper, and cook.'" Lee, in return, undertook to provide for
Michelle's financial needs for the remainder of her life.' Michelle fur-
ther alleged that they cohabited under this arrangement for over five
years before she was forced to leave defendant Lee's household. 9
While the Marvin court found that Michelle would be entitled to re-
cover under the terms of the couple's alleged express contract, it also
noted that even in the absence of such a contract, recovery would be
possible under the theories of implied contract, quantum meruit, im-
plied partnership, or constructive trust.' 0 In finding that parties to a
relationship which had frequently been characterized as "meretri-
cious"'I might have access to equitable or legal remedies, the court ac-
knowledged that it could no longer impose a standard based on "moral
considerations." 
12
In the wake of Marvin, commentators were quick to raise questions
concerning its applicability to couples of the same sex. 13 Indeed,
Marvin has subsequently been relied upon in the trial court pleadings
of two well publicized California cases involving property rights of gay
couples.' 4 This comment will examine the possibility that Marvin's le-
5. 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
6. Id
7. Id
8. Id
9. Id
10. Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32.
11. E.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 664, 371 P.2d 329, 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 597
(1962).
12. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
13. E.g., Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of
Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 106 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Bruch]; Kay &
Amyx, Marvin v. Marvin: Preserving the Options, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 937, 967-68 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Kay & Amyx]; Comment, Beyond Marvin. 4 Proposalfor Quasi-Spousal
Support, 30 STAN. L. REV. 359, 359 n.4 (1978).
14. Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Plaintiff at 1-3, Richardson v. Conley,
No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978); L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1978, § I, at
26, col. 5. See Complaint at 1-3, Jones v. Estate of Daly, No. WEP 14762 (Santa Monica
Super. Ct., July 28, 1978).
In view of the fact that a significant minority of the population is gay, the author believes
that suits of this nature are latent and forthcoming in the wake of Marvin. Recent estimates
placed the number of homosexuals in the United States in the neighborhood of 20 million.
NEWSWEEK, June 6, 1977, at 16. According to the Kinsey Report, ten percent of the white
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gal and equitable remedies would be available to cohabiting couples of
the same sex.
II. THE LIMITED OPTIONS PRIOR TO MARVIN
Contrary to some popular misconceptions, Marvin did not signal a
complete break with the judicial past in California.'5 Courts had previ-
ously enforced express oral agreements between cohabiting partners as
long as sexual services were not the consideration contemplated by the
parties.' 6 Pooling arrangements and agreements to share assets equally
were also readily enforced.' 7 Additionally, even in the absence of an
express agreement, equitable considerations often dictated that the
partners share the combined property accumulations in proportion to
their initial contributions. 8
But the same courts also permitted moral considerations to control
many of their decisions.' 9 Thus, courts would award a putative spouse
(ie., one who mistakenly, but in good faith believed there was a valid
marriage) the reasonable value of her services, but deny the same
award to one who "cohabit[ed] with a man in a knowingly meretricious
relationship .. 20
male population is more or less exclusively homosexual for a three year period or longer. A.
KINSEY, W. POMEROY, & C. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 651 (1948).
15. See Kay & Amyx, supra note 13, at 954-58.
16. E.g., Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 701-02, 12 P.2d 430, 431 (1932); Bridges v.
Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 363, 270 P.2d 69, 71 (1954); Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95
Cal. App. 2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950). See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 670,
557 P.2d at 113, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 822 and cases cited therein.
17. E.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943); Garcia v. Vene-
gas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 368, 235 P.2d 89, 92 (1951).
18. E.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943). See also Garcia
v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 368, 235 P.2d 89, 92 (1951) (recovery was allowed under
pooling arrangement which was likened to a partnership or joint business enterprise).
Assuming that a cohabiting spouse had furnished 50 percent of the initial contributions,
she would be entitled to one half of the accumulated assets because of Vallera's equitable
considerations. But she would not be entitled to an equal share of the assets by law under
California's community property system. Legal rights to community property cannot arise
in a Marvin-type cohabitation situation. E.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d at 665, 557 P.2d
at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819; Estate of Foy, 109 Cal. App. 2d 329, 332, 240 P.2d 685, 687
(1952); Baskett v. Crook, 86 Cal. App. 2d 355, 359, 195 P.2d 39, 42 (1948).
19. See, e.g., Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 536, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604, 608
(1975) (Paras, J., concurring) (denial of awards to cohabiting spouse was done on the basis
of moral grounds); Hill v. Estate of Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 603, 213 P.2d 727, 730
(1950) (law does not award compensation to "concubine" living with a man).
20. E.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 664, 371 P.2d 329, 333, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 597
(1962). See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d 681, 685, 134 P.2d 761, 763 (1943) (because
there was no evidence that cohabiting spouse had contributed any funds towards acquisition
of property, even though services were involved, she was not entitled to an undivided one-
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES L4W REVIEW [Vol. 12
Decisions prior to Marvin also followed Justice Traynor's majority
opinion in Vallera v. Vallera2' which held that a woman living with a
man and having no genuine belief in the legality of the marriage did
not acquire "by reason of cohabitation alone the rights of co-tenant in
his earnings and accumulations . "..."22 What Justice Traynor ap-
peared to be saying was that a woman in such a situation had to pro-
duce evidence that the relationship rested on considerations other than
the mere fact of cohabitation. If she could have produced such evi-
dence, recovery might have been possible.
But decisions following Vallera gave "cohabitation alone" a mean-
ing more equivalent to "if she cohabits at all." Justice Peters sensed
this judicial overbreadth when he noted that one state supreme court
majority applied this interpretation even in a situation where there
were services "in excess of normal marital services."23 Such a situation
would be analogous to the one in Vallera in which there were consider-
ations other than the mere fact of cohabitation and where recovery
should have been possible.24
III. MARviN's NEUTRAL MORAL STANDARD
The Marvin court, too, recognized that a cohabiting spouse might be
awarded the reasonable value of his or her services even in the absence
half interest). But see Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d at 672, 371 P.2d at 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. at
602 (Peters, J., dissenting) ("funds" includes services as well as money or tangible property);
Delamour v. Roger, 7 La. Ann. 152, 155 (1852) (equitable considerations entitled d cohab-
iting spouse to half the property acquired when her capital and labor contributed "a full
share toward the results. .. ."); Hayworth v. Williams, 102 Tex. 308, 314, 116 S.W. 43, 46
(1909) (cohabiting woman did not have to prove she produced part of the money that was
used to purchase land, but only that she contributed by working with her partner towards a
common purpose).
In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 349-53, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862, 863-66 (1973),
recognized the inequities of courts giving property awards to putative spouses but denying
them to cohabitants. The Cary court reasoned that because California's Family Law Act
had eliminated fault or guilt as a basis for dividing marital property, it could use this law's
policy provisions to eliminate any distinctions between a cohabitant and a putative spouse.
Although the Marvin court disapproved of Cary's reasoning, it expressly approved of Carp's
perception of the unfairness of the Vallera and Keene decisions. 18 Cal. 3d at 681, 557 P.2d
at 120-21, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 829-30.
For a general discussion of the rights of the putative spouse in California, see Laughran &
Laughran, Property and Inheritance Rights of Putative Spouses in Caifornia: Selected
Problems and Suggested Solutions, 11 Lov. L.A.L. REv. 45 (1977); Luther & Luther, Suport
and Property Rights of the Putative Spouse, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 311 (1973).
21. 21 Cal. 2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
22. Id at 684-85, 134 P.2d at 762-63.
23. Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 671, 371 P.2d 329, 338, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 602 (1962)
(Peters, J., dissenting).
24. See id
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of an express agreement between the parties.25 Additionally, the court
recognized that "tihe mores of society have indeed changed so radi-
cally in regard to cohabitation that we cannot impose a standard based
on alleged moral considerations . ."."26 Further, the Marvin court
noted that "adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual
relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract
respecting their earnings and property rights."'27
The California Supreme Court's express approval of the equivalent
of a consenting adult standard and its refusal to impose a moral judg-
ment upon a couple living in what has traditionally been regarded as a
"sinful" relationship28 is noteworthy. The court was, in effect, expres-
sing the same policy that was adopted by the California legislature in
1975 when it passed the Brown Act2 9 decriminalizing acts of adulterous
25. 18 Cal. 3d at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. See also Bruch, supra note
13, at 110-14 (presumption that household services are intended as a gift is unrealistic).
26. 18 Cal. 3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831 (emphasis added). See also
Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 229 (1934) ("Equity does not demand that its suitors
[lead] blameless lives.").
27. 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
28. Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. See, e.g., In re Estate of Thornton,
81 Wash. 2d 72, 77-78, 499 P.2d 864, 867 (1972) (idea that a putative spouse could have an
interest in property, but that a spouse who cohabited could not, "has a moralistic aura, but is
realistically and objectively questionable."); Omer v. Omer, 11 Wash. App. 386, 391, 523
P.2d 957, 960 (1974) (judgments should not be made based upon illicit nature of relation-
ship).
Marvin's moral neutrality is consistent with the approach taken by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals in Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Norton,
the Civil Service Commission had discharged an employee for off-duty conduct that was of
an "immoral" homosexual nature. The court found that the jurisdiction of the Commission
was limited "to the things which are Caesar's," that the Commission had not been ordained
to enforce "absolute moral judgments," and that "the notion that. . . the federal bureau-
cracy [could] enforce the majority's conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of its
employees is at war with elementary concepts of liberty, privacy, and diversity." Id at 1165.
The Oregon Federal District Court followed this same standard when it found that a
homosexual immigrant was eligible for naturalization on the basis of his "good moral char-
acter." In re Brodie, 394 F. Supp. 1208, 1211 (D. Or. 1975). The court's opinion was based
upon the factual findings that Brodie's sexual activity was no different from that of many
twenty-eight year olds, that it was conducted in private, and that "'no harm to the secular
interests of the community [was] involved."' Id (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.5,
Comments, at 277-78 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955)).
29. Law of May 13, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 5, 6, 7, 10, [1975] Cal. Stats. 131 (amending CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288a; repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 269a, 269b).
As suggested by one author, one of the major reasons for the passage of this bill was the
legislature's desire to prohibit governmental interference into the privacy of interpersonal
relationships. Comment, The Property Rights of Meretricious Spouses: The Effect of the New
"No Punishment" Policy Indicated by the Consenting Adults Bill, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REv.
783, 805-06 & n.150 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rights of Spouses].
Many courts, unfortunately, have allowed moral considerations to affect their decisions
regarding homosexuals. One of the most recent examples was the case Doe v. Common-
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cohabitation, sodomy, and oral copulation between private consenting
adults.
In this regard, the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court in the
case of Latham v. Latham3" is instructive. The plaintiff, who had co-
habited with the defendant and had performed normal domestic serv-
ices, claimed an interest in the defendant's property based on a prior
agreement. The defendant demurred on the ground that the contract
wealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), ard mem., 425 U.S.
9Q1 (1976), which upheld the constitutionality of Virginia's sodomy statute. The majority
relied upon Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and noted that:
Adultery, homosexualiy and the like are sexual intimacies which the Stateforblds
. [E]ven though the State has determined that the use of contraceptives is as iniq-
uitous as any act of extra-marital sexual immorality, the intrusion of the whole machin-
ery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy, . . . is surely a very
different thing indeed from punishing those who establish intimacies which the law has
always forbidden and which can have no claim to social protection.
403 F. Supp. at 1201 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (em-
phasis added by court).
The court concluded that private consenting behavior between a same-sex couple was
"likely to end in a contribution to moral delinquency." 403 F. Supp. at 1202. This would
supposedly justify the need for state regulation. But cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
566-67 (1969) (there was little empirical basis for the State of Georgia to assert that exposure
to obscene materials would lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence).
The approach of the Doe court is also seriously undercut by Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) which recognized that a state has no right to intrude into the privacy of an un-
married couple's "immoral" relationship (ie., fornication or adultery). Id at 453.
The reasoning of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 547 P.2d
6 (1976) (en banc) reflects a similar tendency to moralize. In overturning a lower court
ruling which held that the state's sodomy statute was unconstitutional as it applied to con-
senting adults, the court noted that: "[w]hile [the Supreme Court] has said in Griswold and
Eisenstadt that the State cannot interfere with the private sexual behavior of two adults, in
neither of those opinions did it determine that the State could not regulate sexual
misconduct." Id at 110, 547 P.2d at 9 (emphasis added).
Thus, the constitutionality of the state's sodomy statute was justified on the basis of the
court's own preconceived assumption of what constituted "misconduct." Id Also, the
Bateman court apparently failed to appreciate that implicit in Eisenstadt was the concept
that the state had no business attempting to draw lines or to intrude into a person's right to
privacy especially when it came to matters of intimate sexual behavior without a compelling
state interest. 1d at 112, 547 P.2d at 11 (Gordon, J., dissenting). See Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. at 453 n.10 ("[A]lso fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited
circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.").
In defining what was sexual misconduct, both the Doe and Bateman courts relied heavily
on the Levitical proscription against sodomy ("Leviticus 18:22: 'Thou shalt not lie with
mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination.' "). 403 F. Supp. at 1202 n.2; 113 Ariz. at
111, 547 P.2d at 10. Thus, both decisions conceivably could be challenged on the basis of the
establishment clause of the first amendment of the Constitution.
The dissent in Doe also aptly noted that the majority had acted on the tacit assumption
that concepts of morality and decency rather than the constitutional right to privacy were
the central issues in question. 403 F. Supp. at 1205 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
30. 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
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was void because the consideration for the agreement was "future illicit
cohabitation."3 The court, however, found the agreement valid. It
was directly influenced by the Oregon legislature's prior repeal of a
statute which had made "illicit" cohabitation a criminal offense.
32
Thus, in Latham, cohabiting partners received recognition because the
state no longer had an interest in invoking criminal sanctions against
their conduct. Under the same rationale, a same-sex couple should be
afforded equivalent legal recognition once a state has decriminalized
private sexual activities between consenting adults of the same sex.
Since the Brown Act did just that, one would expect California
courts, following the lead of the California legislature, to have little
difficulty in extending Marvin rights to same-sex couples. In fact, the
Marvin holding itself could be read as a step in this direction. For
instance, the court noted that "no policy" precluded the courts from
enforcing agreements between cohabiting partners.33 The enactment of
the Brown Act would also seem to signal an end to any major state
policy that could possibly preclude enforcement of agreements between
couples of the same sex.
In addition, policy arguments that such an extension would be seen
as judicial encouragement of same-sex life styles are suspect. In the
wake of Marvin, couples might actually be discouraged from living to-
gether in an intimate relationship because of the realization that they
would be held to a higher standard of accountability by the courts.34
Nor would an extension of Marvin's remedies necessarily discourage
other relationships such as those between heterosexuals or the tradi-
tional marriage bond.35 In some cultures, widespread homosexual be-
havior has been found to coexist with traditional stable family and
marital relationships. 36 Also, since traditional matrimony is by law de-
31. Id. at 423, 547 P.2d at 145.
32. Id at 427, 547 P.2d at 147. See also Rights of Spouses, supra note 29, at 807-08 (since
legislature legalized consenting adult sex acts in private, judiciary should no longer bar rem-
edies to cohabiting spouses in name of a policy that has been repudiated).
33. 18 Cal. 3d at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825:
34. See generally id. at 685-86, 557 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832 (Clark, J., concurring
and dissenting).
35. In Marvin, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that granting remedies to non-mar-
ried cohabitants would discourage tradition marriage. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122,
134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. The court, however, observed that "nothing we have said in this
opinion should be taken to derogate from that institution [marriage]." Id at 684, 557 P.2d
at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
36. See A. KINSEY, W. POMEROY, C. MARTIN, & P. GEBHARD, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
HUMAN FEMALE 483 (1953), quoted in Hefner, The Legal Enforcement of Morality, 40 U.
COLO. L. REV.199, 216-17 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Human Female].
1979]
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nied to same-sex couples,37 allowing them other legal options could
hardly be expected to affect adversely the incidence of marriage
throughout the rest of society.
As the Marvin court pointed out, any policy designed to promote a
particular type of relationship (such as marriage) cannot be justified by
the perpetuation of inequities imposed on those living outside that rela-
tionship. 8 Judicial intervention in such situations should not only be
tolerated but actively encouraged. Justice Finley of the Washington
Supreme Court was well aware of this need in Humphries v. Riveland
3 9
where he noted that:
The courts have the power, indeed I believe a clear duty, to consider and
settle the questions before them concerning the property rights of such
persons [cohabiting couples] [citations omitted]. The "washing of hands"
device seemed to have satisfied Pontius Pilate. However, the device was
simply an effort to put responsibility aside. It failed then to meet and
provide real solutions for the real problems of real people.
40
This need can be just as great in a same-sex relationship as in a het-
erosexual one. Even though the gender of one of the parties is differ-
ent, often one of the parties will assume the same dependent
"homemaker role" that Marvin sought to protect.4n
IV. MARVIN'S SHIFT FROM STATUS TO CONTRACT
Unlike its predecessors, Marvin shifted the focus of judicial analysis
away from the existence of a couple's martial status and toward the
contractual nature of their relationship. However, as the California
courts had previously done in Vallera42 and its progeny,43 Marvin ac-
knowledged that the reasonable expectations surrounding the status of
marriage were not present in a cohabiting spouse situation.4 But
rather than allow the lack of marital status to be a major barrier stand-
ing in the way of judicial relief,45 Marvin expanded the scope of avail-
37. See notes 1 & 2 supra and accompanying text.
38. 18 Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
39. 67 Wash. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965).
40. Id at 398, 407 P.2d at 979 (Finley, J., dissenting). See West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d
311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957) (Finley, J., concurring) (practice of leaving property with
spouse who has legal title often works to the "advantage of the cunning and the shrewd").
41. Prager, Sharing Princiles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1977).
42. 21 Cal. 2d at 685, 134 P.2d at 763.
43. E.g., Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d 708, 719, 200 P.2d 49, 55-56 (1948).
44. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
45. See, e.g., Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal. 2d at 685, 134 P.2d at 763 (in the absence of an
express contract between unmarried cohabitants, there was no justification for trial court's
finding that each party owned an undivided one-half interest in property); Hill v. Estate of
[Vol. 12
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able remedies using the rationale that "other expectations and
equitable considerations" outside the marriage relationship still re-
mained.46 Finally, considerations of status were virtually eliminated
when the court announced that cohabiting parties should be treated as
other unmarried persons who enter into contracts.47
With marital status no longer at issue, the basic theme developed by
the Marvin court was that cohabiting partners could assert rights based
upon accepted principles of implied contract or equity.48 Thus, in the
absence of express agreements, courts following Marvin should look at
the nature of the couple's relationship,49 or their conduct,50 to deter-
mine if property awards should be made on the basis of these remedies.
Further, the court mentioned the possibility that economic transactions
between the partners should be controlled by principles governing a
"confidential relationship. ' 5' Such a relationship could, as the Oregon
Supreme Court observed in Latham, contemplate "all the burdens and
amenities of married life."
52
Courts outside California have focused on various factors in deter-
mining monetary and property awards. These include whether the par-
ties had indicated by their conduct that they intended to share their
property equally,53 the type of services rendered 5 4 whether such serv-
Westbrook, 95 Cal. App. 2d 599, 602, 213 P.2d 727, 729 (1950) (in the absence of an express
agreement between cohabiting spouses, there is no implied obligation for a man to compen-
sate his spouse for value of household services); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88 Cal. App. 2d
708, 719, 200 P.2d 49, 56 (1948) (plaintiff spouse could not be compensated for her services
in the absence of an express agreement).
46. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. Cf. Glona v. American
Guarantee, 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968) (illegitimate children given legal recognition in insurance
recovery cases, but not to same degree as legitimate offspring).
47. 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
48. Id at 665, 675, 557 P.2d at 110, 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819, 825. In addition to an
implied contract theory, Marvin mentioned the possibility of using an implied partnership, a
constructive trust, or quantum meruit. Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-
32.
In moving away from a primary emphasis on marital status, Marvin appears to be follow-
ing a fundamental societal trend. See generally Glendon, Marriage and the State: The With-
ering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 709-10 (1976); Weitzman, Legal Regulation of
Marriage. Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1249-58 (1974).
49. 18 Cal. 3d, 675 n.ll, 557 P.2d at 117 n.l1, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 826 n.ll.
50. Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. In looking at the nature of the
couple's relationship and their conduct, the court would be able to protect their "reasonable
expectations." Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
51. Id at 682 n.22, 557 P.2d at 121 n.22, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830 n.22.
52. Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. at 427, 547 P.2d at 147.
53. Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 122, 577 P.2d 507, 510 (1978).
54. Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 409, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1977).
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ices were intended as a gratuity,55 the duration and stability of the
relationship,56 the degree of dependency experienced by the "home-
making" party,57 and whether the couple held themselves out as hus-
band and wife. 8
As applied to the factual circumstances in Marvin, these factors may
provide some indication of situations where the existence of an implied
contract could be found. According to Michelle Triola's allegations,
both parties lived together for a number of years59 and held themselves
out as husband and wife." In addition, she assumed the duties of
homemaker, cook, and companion,61 while her partner agreed to pro-
vide for her needs.62
55. See In re McLain's Estate, 126 Or. 456, 462-63, 270 P. 534, 535-36 (1928) (services of
aunt who had moved into home to care for invalid niece were not presumed to be gratuitous,
and in absence of express agreement, an implied contract for their payment would arise).
56. E.g., Roznowski v. Bozyk, 73 Mich. App. 405, 409, 251 N.W.2d 606, 608 (1977); In re
Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 75, 499 P.2d 864, 865-66 (1972); Omer v. Omer, 11
Wash. App. 386, 391, 523 P.2d 957, 960 (1974). See, e.g., West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394
Mich. 334, 338, 230 N.W.2d 545, 546 (1975) (court contrasted long and continuing relation-
ship of thirteen years with previous case which had denied relief to a relationship of rela-
tively short duration). See generally Note, Meretricious Relationshis-Property Rights." A
Meretricious Relationship May Create An Implied Partnership, 48 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1973).
The Washington courts have utilized the theories of constructive trust, Omer v. Omer, 11
Wash. App. at 393, 523 P.2d at 961, or implied partnership, In re Estate of Thornton, 81
Wash. 2d at 80-81, 499 P.2d at 868, in order to circumvent the strictures of Creasman v.
Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948), where the Supreme Court of Washington held
that in the absence of some trust relationship, property of cohabiting couple belonged to the
partner possessing legal title. Id at 351, 196 P.2d at 841.
The Washington Supreme Court later expressed dissatisfaction with this presumption and
its "moralistic aura," but declined to expressly overrule it. In re Estate of Thornton, 81
Wash. 2d at 77-79, 499 P.2d at 866-67. A Washington appellate court also took exception to
Creasman and noted that "certain meretricious relationships of long and durable standing
may give rise to community property rights similar to those which prevail between married
persons." Omer v. Omer, I1 Wash. App. at 391, 523 P.2d at 960. The appellate court also
advocated an approach that would examine the substance of "the relationship itself" in or-
der to determine if "community property laws should be applied by analogy." Id.
57. See, e.g., West v. Barton-Malow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 340-41, 230 N.W.2d 545, 547-48
(1975) (plaintiff who had lived with a man for thirteen years, had performed housework, and
was totally dependent on him for financial support, was considered an eligible dependent for
workmen's compensation benefits).
58. Eg., In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 75, 499 P.2d 864, 865-66 (1972). See,
e.g., West v. Barton-Marlow Co., 394 Mich. 334, 340-41, 230 N.W.2d 545, 546 (1975) (fact
that plaintiff held herself out as wife of cohabiting spouse was a factor in establishing her
eligibility for workmen's compensation benefits as a dependent).
59. 18 Cal. 3d at 666, 557 P.2d at 110, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 819.
60. Id
61. Id
62. Id
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V. MARVIN APPLIED TO A SAME-SEX COUPLE
Under Marvin's contractually oriented analysis, same-sex couples
should be afforded the same remedies as their heterosexual counter-
parts if their relationship were fashioned along similar lines. This ex-
tension of contractual and equitable remedies would be further justified
by Marvin's approach which places cohabitants on the same footing as
"other unmarried persons,"63 who are free to contract regardless of
their marital status or sexual preferences.
The potential need for this type of extension was aptly illustrated by
a recent San Diego County Superior Court case 6' in which a lesbian
sought compensation for the reasonable value of her household services
from her estranged partner.6 At the defendant's request, the plaintiff
had given up gainful employment in New York and had moved to San
Diego to assume the role of companion and homemaker to the defend-
ant.66 She apparently understood that her efforts would be directed to-
ward furthering the defendant's career and that both partners would
share in its financial benefits.67 The couple had memorialized the
terms of their agreement in a written contract and had considered
themselves "man"' and "wife. "68
The plaintiff relied heavily on Marvin in asking for enforcement of
the express agreement and for temporary support pursuant to the rea-
sonable expectations of the parties.69 She was awarded temporary sup-
port pending the final outcome of the litigation,7" but the issue of
whether a Marvin-type contract would have been implied was not ad-
dressed by the court because of the existence of the written agree-
63. Id at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. Earlier the court had noted with
approval Justice Peters' dissent in Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 672,371 P.2d 329, 338,21
Cal. Rptr. 593, 602 (1962) which viewed a cohabiting couple's arrangement as a "plain busi-
ness relationship [where] a contract would be implied." 18 Cal. 3d at 678-79, 557 P.2d at
119, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
In some situations where no express contract has been made, an analysis based on the
theory of promissory estoppel and reliance may be appropriate. See generally Simitian,
Property Rights and the Unmarried Homemaker: Marvin v. Marvin and the Caifornia
Experience, 5 COMMUNITY PROP. J. 3, 9 (1978).
64. Richardson v. Conley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978).
65. Complaint at 5, Richardson v. Conley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct.,
May 17, 1978).
66. Id at 2.
67. Id
68. Id at 3.
69. Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Plaintiff at 1-3, Richardson v. Conley,
No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978).
70. L.A. Times, June 7, 1978, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
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Even if there had been no express agreement, an extension of the
Marvin remedies would seem justified. Based on the plaintiff's allega-
tions, the couple in effect had held themselves out as husband and wife
by entering into a "marriage" ceremony. 2 There was a major degree
of dependence and reliance by one of the parties. The homemaking
spouse had performed valuable services and both partners' efforts were
mutally directed toward what appeared to be the joint accumulation of
property.73 Thus, there would appear to be sufficient grounds for find-
ing an implied contract based on the reasonable expectations of the
parties and an apparent tacit understanding that their property would
be divided. 4 In addition, the observations of the superior court judge
who tried the case are noteworthy. He commented that "the fact that
[the couple was] of the same sex [was] of no leqal consequence.'
VI. THE NEED FOR A CONSISTENT CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD
Whether same-sex couples will be afforded this degree of legal recog-
nition in other courts is highly questionable. Courts have sometimes
been reluctant to redress grievances where the civil rights of gays are
invaded.76 And in actions involving overt discrimination, courts have
refused to extend legislation such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act77
beyond enumerated categories such as sex and race to encompass that
of sexual preference.78
71. See id at 2, col. 4.
72. Complaint at 3, Richardson v. Conley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct.,
May 17, 1978).
73. See id at 2. According to Marvin "[tihe parties may well expect that property will be
divided in accord with the parties' own tacit understanding and that in the absence of such
understanding the courts will fairly apportion property accumulated through mutual effort."
18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830.
74. See 18 Cal. 3d at 682, 557 P.2d at 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 830. The one major difference
between Richardson v. Conley and Marvin was the relatively short duration of the relation-
ship in San Diego-September 1977 to March 1978. Complaint at 2, 3, Richardson v. Con-
ley, No. 416547 (San Diego County Super. Ct., May 17, 1978).
75. L.A. Times, June 7, 1978, § 2, at 1, col. 5 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202-
03 (E.D. Va. 1975), a§'d mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (court upheld validity of Virginia's
sodomy statute as it applied to consenting adult sexual activities done in private); State v.
Bateman, 113 Ariz. 107, 110-11, 547 P.2d 6, 9-10 (1976) (en bane) (state has power to regu-
late private sexual "misconduct" including sodomy). But see, e.g., Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d
1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Civil Service Commission could not enforce moral judgments
against off-duty homosexual activity).
77. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1970)).
78. See Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369, 370 (D. Md. 1977) ("Title VII does not
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But such discrimination can be challenged if it involves a classifica-
tion of an inherently suspect nature79 or if it infringes on the exercise of
a fundamental right."0 It would then be subject to strict judicial scru-
tiny' and could only be justified by a "compelling state interest."8 2
Under this type of analysis, an allegedly supect class or a fundamen-
tal right need not be summarily rejected simply because it has not been
recognized by statute or prior case law. For instance, in Serrano v.
Priest,8 3 the plaintiff's contention that education was a fundamental in-
terest was not supported by any direct authority.84 Nevertheless, the
California Supreme Court found that education was a fundamental
right and dealt with it under a strict scrutiny standard.8
Discrimination involving same-sex couples could conceivably face
similar challenges under this type of analysis because it would appear
reach situations involving transsexuals, homosexuals, or bisexuals"). Cf., e.g., Smith v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1978) (Title VII did not apply when male
employee was discharged because of "effeminacy"); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
566 F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (the term "sex" in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
should be given its traditional meaning regarding discrimination between male and female
and did not extend to transsexualism); Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F.
Supp. 456, 457 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (discrimination because of transsexualism not covered by
the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
A much broader standard of interpretation has been used by California courts in cases
involving discrimination in business practices. The California Supreme Court in the case of
In re Cox, 3 Cal. 3d 205, 474 P.2d 992, 90 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1970) noted that the state's civil
rights legislation, the Unruh Civil Rights Act, ch. 1193, § 1, 1974 Cal. Stats. 2568 (codified at
CAL. CIV. CODE § 51), should be interpreted broadly to include "all arbitrary discrimination
by a business enterprise." 3 Cal. 3d at 212, 474 P.2d at 995, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 27. The Cox
court reasoned that the traditional enumeration of color, race, ancestry, sex, and national
origin contained in the statute was illustrative rather than restrictive. fd at 216, 474 P.2d at
999, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 31. This rationale was based on the earlier cases of Stoumen v. Reilly,
37 Cal. 2d 713, 234 P.2d 969 (1951) and Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 227
P.2d 449 (1951) which had invalidated discrimination against a homosexual and a person of
"immoral character," respectively. 37 Cal. 2d at 716, 234 P.2d at 971; 36 Cal. 2d at 738, 227
P.2d at 452.
The Cox court reasoned that since the Unruh Act was written after Orloff and Stoumen
had been decided, the California legislature was undoubtedly aware of these decisions and
had given no indication that it wished to overturn or disregard their effects. 3 Cal. 3d at 215-
16, 474 P. 2d at 998, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 30.
79. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (race); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (national origin); Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 18, 485 P.2d
529, 540, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329, 340 (1971) (sex).
80. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
81. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
82. E.g., Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963).
83. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
84. Id at 604, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
85. See id at 608-10, 614, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19, 623.
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to interfere directly with an individual's fundamental right to privacy
in sexual matters. This right has been emphatically recognized by the
United States Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut86 and Eisen-
stadt v. Baird.7 In addition, the Supreme Court in Stanley v. Georgia8
extended this right by holding that the state could not infringe on an
individual's right to view "obscene" films in the privacy of his own
home.89 Although it is arguable that Stanley can be distinguished on
the ground that it involved free speech, the case is instructive because it
protected an individual's right to privacy in matters that the state
viewed as being immoral.90 Stanley also recognized an individual's
right "to satisy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his
own home."9 '
Measured against these standards, a state's justification for regulat-
ing consensual behavior between couples of the same sex in the privacy
of their own homes becomes rather hollow. If the state cannot invade a
person's right to view "obscene" films, it is difficult to understand how
it could also justify discriminatory regulations aimed at discouraging
the activities of same-sex couples in the same private setting.
It also becomes difficult to account for any "compelling state inter-
est" in regard to gays when one makes a comparison with the precedent
established in Roe v. Wade.92 Roe prohibits state interference with a
woman's election to have an abortion during the first trimester of her
pregnancy because of her overriding right to privacy, even though a
potential life (as some would view it) may hang in the balance. 93 Thus,
if under Roe, state interest were insufficient to justify interference with
a person's right to privacy, surely a same-sex couple should have an
even stronger claim for the same consideration.
Nor would it seem permissible under the equal protection clause 94 to
establish one standard of property right laws for heterosexual couples
and another for couples of the same sex. Otherwise the state would be
"providing dissimilar treatment," analogous to what the state of Con-
necticut attempted to do in Eisenstadt when it adopted one standard of
regulations for married couples and another for those living outside of
86. 381 U.S. 479 (1961).
87. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
88. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
89. Id at 565-66.
90. Id
91. Id at 565.
92. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
93. See id at 153, 162.
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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wedlock.95
VII. CONCLUSION
In view of the paucity of Marvin-type precedents involving same-sex
cohabitation, this area of the law will undoubtedly remain unsettled for
the immediate future. Although numerous federal and state courts, as
well as state legislatures, still feel that questionable standards of moral-
ity justify denial of rights to homosexuals, 96 arguments can be made
that Marvin's contractual and equitable remedies should extend to
couples of the same sex. With courts in some states97 focusing on the
nature, scope, and merits of the heterosexual cohabitant's relationship
rather than on their lack of marital status or their "immoral" life style,
consistency would seem to demand that, at least in those jurisdictions,
same-sex couples be afforded similar treatment. There is additionally a
growing recognition that many same-sex couples lead relatively stable
and conventional life styles98 which would tend to further justify a
more even-handed approach by the courts. Perhaps with increased un-
derstanding will come increased legal recognition.
George P. Ritter
95. See 405 U.S. at 454-55.
96. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for Richmond, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202
(E.D. Va. 1975), afdmem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976). See also Annot., 58 A.L.R.3d 636, 643-48
(1978).
97. California, Washington, Oregon, Michigan, and Minnesota appear to have made the
greatest strides in this direction. See, e.g., Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252-55 (1977)
(Minnesota court relied heavily on Marvin, Estate of Thornton, and Onzer to find that prop-
erty accumulated between cohabiting couple should be divided equally. See notes 51-57
supra and accompanying text. But cf, e.g., Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d
81, 82 (1977) (illicit cohabitation constituted immoral consideration for an agreement be-
tween cohabitants and such agreement was unenforceable at law or in equity). Rehak was
strongly criticized in a casenote in 12 GA. L. REV. 361 (1978).
98. NEWSWEEK, March 27, 1978, at 98. See generally Human Female, supra note 36, at
458 (of females sampled who had experienced homosexual relations, 51 percent had had
only a single partner).
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